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Abstract
The reaction of the government in Kenya, like many other governments around 
the world, to terrorist attacks has generally been to strengthen existing laws and 
enact novel laws, especially those that aid the state’s intelligence-gathering capa-
bilities, along with those that are punitive. In some cases, even in Kenya, States 
have taken, or have attempted to take, extra-Constitutional and unconstitutional 
actions. This is the approach that this paper characterises as arising from ‘temp-
tation of power’, and in that regard, this interdisciplinary paper is—through an 
analysis of scholarship in law, sociology and information/ communication—an 
attempt to investigate the origin, results and wisdom of such an approach in the 
war against terror, its effect on the rule of law and minority rights in society; and 
propose why and how it can be avoided. 
I. Introduction
If  one would, of  late,1 say that the nation of  Kenya has become a haven for 
terrorists, one would have good reason with reference to the line of  terror attacks 
that the nation has suffered, almost consistently, in the last four years.2
What catches the eye of  any keen observer from this catalogue3 is not that 
there have previously occurred much fewer terrorist attacks in Kenya4 but rather 
* The author is a student at the Strathmore University Law School in Nairobi, Kenya. In its writing and 
compilation, the author benefited enormously from the advice and editing of  many but especially 
one Ms AnnBeatrice Njarara, for whom much gratitude is, as a result, owed.
1 This paper was first written and compiled between April and May 2015. 
2 See the escalation in terror attacks in Kenya in a list detailing each attack’s location, nature, death 
and injury toll at https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1r3FAovpHPMjaU234VwyuM5Qxg95
11zXVRJjqeG9AIZc/edit#gid=0 on 11 December 2015.
3 https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1r3FAovpHPMjaU234VwyuM5Qxg9511zXVRJjqeG9A
IZc/edit#gid=0 on 11 December 2015.
4 See Federation of  American Scientists Accountability Board Report, Report on the bombings of  US 
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the way in which the attacks escalated, and then became common fold, so much 
so that only the ones in which a huge number of  people lost their lives, or were 
injured, elicited response from the highest echelons of  government. And since 
this is a paper that attempts to prescribe, dissect, analyse and correct what it is 
that leads to government actors’ sometimes unconstitutional response/s to ter-
rorism, it is prudent to begin by looking at how government actors did indeed 
respond to the terrorist attacks. And it follows that to successfully look at how 
government actors (whom I hereafter refer to simply as ‘government’ or ‘the 
state’) unconstitutionally reacted to the attacks, it is necessary that one begins by 
looking at the events, and then examine the pressures, that come with the differ-
ent terrorist attacks in Kenya.
II. The influence of the press and the national mood after terrorist 
attacks
To understand the state’s response to terrorist attacks, one must begin by 
formulating an imaginary dichotomy of  terrorist attacks in Kenya; the minor ter-
rorist attacks and the major terrorist attacks. This differentiation is informed not 
by a failure to appreciate ‘lesser’ human life lost, the pain of  loved ones and fear 
of  those who witnessed the act—no matter how small—but rather by the nature 
of  the public mood (or opinion) itself. For the purposes of  this paper, we will 
examine ‘public opinion’ as per the critical theory of  information and communi-
cation. Under it, public opinion is an imaginary, ideal, and utopian referent that 
serves essentially as a legitimizing principle for political discourses and actions. 
More concretely, it is the fragmentary result of  the public diffusion of  speeches 
made by the political class and the media. Public opinion, though thought to 
be so, is not the sum of  individual opinions but is constructed by social actors 
interested in linking their plans to the people’s will in order to increase their le-
gitimacy. This perspective rests on a profound intellectual disagreement with the 
liberal-pluralist-positivist perspective.5
Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania on 7 August 1998, January 1999, fas.org/irp/
threat/arb/accountability_report.html on 7 December 2015. On August 8 1998, the American 
Embassy in Kenya was bombed, leaving about seven people dead and seventy two others injured, 
while on 28 November 2002 Israeli-owned Paradise Hotel faced the brunt of  a terrorist attack that 
saw Al-Qaeda suicide bombers carry out an attack that left 15 dead and destroyed the establishment. 
Apart from these, terrorist attacks have in previous years, before 2011, been almost non-existent. 
5 See Gingras AM and Carrier JP, ‘Public Opinion—Construction and Persuasion’ 21 Canadian Jour-
nal of  Communication, 4(1996), 14.
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Indeed, in all this, one should also see that the public mood can be, and is, 
set and read by the press. The press is, in the words of  V.S Yarros, ‘the director 
and moulder’ of  public mood.6 Indeed, Pierre Bourdieu’s Article ‘L’opinion pub-
lique n’existe pas’, published in 1973,7 is the main reference point for this claim. 
Bourdieu asserts that public opinion is really just a construct of  power relations, 
with those in control (led by the media) being the primary driving force behind it. 
Anne-Marie Gingras and Jean-Pierre Carrier have also gone on to say that 
‘Public opinion is captured partly or mainly through the press, moulded by it, influenced 
by it, or plainly created by it. Although the nature of  the link between public opinion 
and the press remains ambiguous, the very existence of  this link is incontestable.’8
One may say that the advent of  the use of  social media tools means that the 
press is relied on less and less to form public mood, but this would be missing 
the point that even the agenda on social media itself  is formed by the reportage 
of  the day and so it can be said that it is a closed loop that starts with the press. 
This is known as agenda-setting, the theory that the more attention a media out-
let pays to a certain phenomenon, the more importance the public attributes to 
such an issue.9 And key about the press is that it is becoming apparent to keen 
observers that the trend of  interpretive or advocacy journalism rather than re-
porting journalism has begun to seep in. This is the time when journalists come 
to see themselves as creators of  news. They do not see themselves as recorders 
anymore but rather as shapers of  events, with a self-constituted responsibility to 
history; duty binds them to their deadlines and conscience to their self-constitut-
ed responsibility to the people. It is the constant winging of  these reporters on 
the failures of  the state in these attacks, and the reaction to them by the public 
in mood, a reaction particularly able to be brought out by the power of  social 
media, that pressures the state to respond to a terrorist attack. 
6 See Yarros VS, ‘The Press and Public Opinion’, 1899-00, 5 American Journal of  Sociology, 372. The 
liberal-pluralist-positivist school of  thought in Information and Communication, however, insists 
that a scientific national poll is probably the best way that a ‘national mood’ on an issue can be 
known. Still, these polls are not conducted on every issue and yet a national mood can still be 
inferred; perhaps the best example of  this inference being made may be found when judges are 
making rulings and judgements. This author had the privilege of  interviewing a High Court judge 
(notes with the author) who listed criteria considered when making judgements, one of  which was 
‘the prevailing public mood.’ In answering the question on how he was possibly able to know what 
the public mood on an issue was, the Judge’s response was simple: read news, watch news. The press.
7 Bourdieu P, ‘L’opinion publique n’existe pas’ Modern Times, January 1973, 1292-1309.
8 Gingras AM and Carrier JP, ‘Public Opinion—Construction and Persuasion’, 6.
9 See Malcheff  M, ‘Public Perception of  Media Manipulation: the Power of  the Agenda-setting 
function of  the Press Examined’, Master Thesis Paper, Liberty University, 9-11. It is also available 
on Academia.edu.
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The truth in this country is that, spurred by the press, the public mood pays 
little attention to death or injury of  a small number of  people in a terrorist attack, 
thus I call this a minor terrorist attack10 and pays just a little more attention to 
the death and/ or injury of  a larger number of  nondescript people in a terrorist 
attack, and thus I also call this a minor terrorist attack.11 What the public mood 
has been seen to pay attention to for the longest time in this country is the death 
and/ or injury of  a very large number of  people, nondescript12 or elite,13 and 
the death or injury of  a small number of  people who are part of  the elite. Tony 
Bennett also observes this trend in his writing;14 and these I call major terrorist 
attacks.
There is normally a gulf  difference in the way that the state responds to mi-
nor terrorist attacks as compared to the way it responds to major terrorist attacks. 
Typically, a minor terrorist attack will attract a minor response from government, 
and vice versa. In the aftermath of  a minor terrorist attack, for instance, a lo-
cal police chief  may issue a roadside statement to the press as Mandera County 
Police Commander Job Boronjo did on February 5th 2015, after a grenade attack 
injured eight people at a café.15 At best, the National Police Chief  may issue a 
statement to guide the press on what happened and appear to be in charge of  the 
situation, as happened in 2012 when then-National Police Commissioner Mat-
10 For instance, the national newspaper the Daily Nation, the most circulated daily newspaper in Kenya 
according to the Audit Bureau of  Circulation of  Kenya (standing at about 120, 000 copies daily), 
gave the attack on 18 April 2013 at the ‘Kwa Chege’ Hotel in Garissa, Northern Kenya, only minor 
mention on page 3 for one day. Prime-Time news carried it as a third (NTV Kenya), or fourth 
(Kenya Television Network) news item, after exhausting their reporting on the day’s major events. 
11 The attack on 14 December 2013 where a hand grenade was thrown into a minibus in Eastleigh, 
Nairobi leaving 4 dead with over 36 wounded, was given more mention than that described in 
footnote 16, but for just two days of  national news, in both national newspapers; the Daily Nation 
and the Standard. 
12 Compare the prior reaction to the reaction after the attack that took place in Garissa University on 2 
April 2015 (in which a whopping 147 died while 79 were injured) where the national news reported 
on the attack and called for action for over one and a half  weeks. In addition, candles were lit and 
memorial concerts were organized for the bereaved.
13 The attack on the Westgate Mall was perhaps, the best example of  this. Reporting on the attack 
continued for over a month, at first constituting almost 7 pages of  national newspapers and several 
items on prime time news before easing off. In addition, many special monetary contributions were 
made and the public hashtag ‘we are one’, to signify national unity, trended on the social media site 
Twitter. 
14 See Bennett T, Critical Trajectories: Culture, Society, Intellectuals, Blackwell Publishing, 2007, 141-163.
15 In Mr. Boronjo’s words; “Security officials are currently on high alert following information 
of  a planned attack by Al Shabaab in the region, ” he said, adding that “Police are looking for 
suspects reportedly from Somalia on a mission to cause havoc in the country.” See more at http://
morningstarnews.org/2015/02/eight-people-injured-in-grenade-attack-in-northern-kenya/on 11 
May 2015. 
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thew Iteere issued a statement in the aftermath of  a grenade attack at the Bella 
Vista night club in Mombasa on May 15th which killed a woman and wounded 
several people, and for which Al Shabaab were quick to claim responsibility.16 
This holds firm most times, until one considers the phenomenon of  the bored 
press. As this paper attempted to show previously, public mood is set and read by 
the press many times, and when there is a dearth in ‘big’ news items to report17 in 
the news cycles, there is a possibility whereupon issues that would otherwise have 
attracted short news and blown over are sensationalized. This is called ‘yellow 
journalism’ and a treatise on it has been written by W. Joseph Campbell.18 In this 
case, the state becomes prey with the press on the hunt. Perhaps only then will a 
minor terrorist attack, in turn, attract serious state response.
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16 See more at http://www.tourismupdate.co.za/home/detail?Articleid=25139&Article=kenya-
government-responds-to-grenade-attack on 11 May 2015.
17 Normally major political news, events and drama.
18 See Campbell JW, Yellow Journalism: Puncturing the Myths, Defining the Legacies, Praeger Publishers, 2003, 
wholly relevant.
19 See Gartner S, ‘Casualties and public support: an experimental analysis’, Presented at Annual Meet 
of  the Political Science Association of  Philadelphia 2006, wholly relevant.
20 See Dijk TA, ‘Power and the News Media’, University of  Amsterdam, 19-21.
21 See Baum M and Potter P, ‘The Relationships between Mass Media, Public Opinion: Toward a Theo-
retical Synthesis’ Annual Review of  Political Science, University of  California, 2008, 48-51.
22 See DeRouen K Jr. and Peak J, ‘The Dynamics of  Diversion: The Domestic Implications of  Presi-
dential Use of  Force, International Interactions: Empirical and Theoretical Research in International 
Relations’, Routledge Publishers, 2002, 191-211.
23 See Dijk TA, ‘Power and the News Media’, 13-16.
24 See Baum M and Potter P, ‘The Relationships between Mass Media, Public Opinion: Toward a Theo-
retical Synthesis’, 49-50.
25 See Perl R, ‘Terrorism, the Media and Government: Perspectives, Trends and Options for Policy-
makers’, 22 October 1997, available here: http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/state/crs-terror-
media.htm on 16 May 2015.
26 See Briant E, ‘The struggle for Public Opinion within the Media and the Information War on Terror’ 
in ‘The Media: The Terrorists’ Battlefield’ Centre for Excellence Defence against Terrorism (2007), 89.
Mass Media Events
Public Mood/opinion Decision makers
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III. Temptation of power 
The way in which the state responds to a major terrorist attack is a whole 
other matter and it is this that one must linger on, for it is this that forms back-
ground for what this paper calls ‘temptation of  power.’ If  one were to draw a 
recent-day ‘major terrorist attack’ list in this country, it might read something 
as follows: the September 21st 2013 attack on the Westgate Mall, the June 15th 
2014 attack in Mpeketoni, the November 23rd 2014 bus attack near Mandera, the 
December 2nd 2014 quarry attack in Koromey, Mandera and the April 2nd 2015 
attack on Garissa University College, Garissa. There is no doubt that these at-
tacks stunned the national conscience, a conscience that had become used to, and 
therefore immune to, being awoken, by minor terrorist attacks. So how was such 
a national conscience awoken? In the same way that you awake someone who is 
asleep; you shout louder, you shake them harder, you hit them harder. And this is 
exactly what the terrorists did in these attacks.27
When the national conscience is stirred, pressure is felt by those in power, 
those in authority. Transmitted, as this paper has belaboured, mainly by the press, 
this pressure is also ramped up by other caucuses of  society,28 and made out even 
better by a society that is on the edge.29 It is this pressure that leads to what this 
paper calls temptation of  power. The temptation of  power, first broached by 
Theodore H. White30 but today understood varyingly,31 starts with the impatience 
27 From killing and injuring under 20 in the prior grenade attacks, Al Shabaab killed a shocking 65 and 
injured 175 others at the Westgate Mall; killed 28 in the Mandera bus attack; killed 36 in the Koromey 
Quarry attack and killed 147 in the Garissa University College attack.
28 For an academic study of  this, see Baroni L et al, ‘Defining and classifying interest groups’ 3 Interest 
Groups & Advocacy Journal (2014), 141–159. In Kenya, the church, for instance, spoke out: See more 
at http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/Article/2000158909/why-church-is-angry-over-repeated-
terror-attacks on 11 May 2015. So did the Law Society of  East Africa and the Kenyan National 
Union of  Teachers. 
29 There may be few other ways to describe the Kenyan society after these attacks; Text messages 
urging people to stay away from places that they usually frequented are sent back and forth (of  
which this author has received many) and perhaps the best example of  the society being on the edge 
may be the events on April 13 2015 at the University of  Nairobi’s Kikuyu area campus where one 
student died and over one hundred were injured as students took part in a stampede (with some 
jumping from high floors) after they misjudged what was an electric cable burst to be a terrorist 
attack. See more at: http://www.nation.co.ke/news/kikuyu-campus-stampede-transformer-
explosion/-/1056/2683130/-/wbg1vxz/-/index.html on 11 May 2015.
30 White T, The Making of  the President 1972, Atheneum Publishers, New York, 1973, 390.
31 ‘Temptation of  Power’ is today discussed more as a moral issue, that is, that leaders must be careful 
not to fall into the trappings of  power. See for instance former Czechoslovakia President Václav 
Havel’s speech when he accepted the Sonning Prize for his contribution to European civilization 
here: <https://www.cs.utexas.edu/users/vl/notes/havel.html on 15 May 2015. See also
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of  a nation that demands quick solutions. The impatience of  the nation is pre-
sented by society’s caucuses, some of  which have no names; an example of  this 
‘caucus without a name’ is the elite, the establishment. One will never walk into 
a room and find a gold plaque reading that “‘the establishment’ is meeting.” One 
will, however, know when the establishment has met in thinking. This is indeed 
what happened after the attack on the Westgate Mall. For here, before their eyes, 
was the establishment’s way of  life being threatened; for this is where they went 
for their kaffeeklatsches’, this is where their sons and daughters spent time on 
weekends. This is where the self-recognizing noblesse spent their free time.32 
And this is where the terrorists had just hit. Thus all these caucuses apply pres-
sure on those in power to act.
Now there is a membrane of  law and morality that, indefinably, gives the 
state its sacerdotal quality. It is a delicate and flexible membrane which is vital; 
it must contain policy and national action within the law. When the membrane 
haemorrhages—danger. This membrane has definitely been strained and even 
broken many times before33 but that is not to say that it should continue to be 
broken. After all, the government is made of  the law itself, and the law must be 
executed in all its precise purity. It is that pressure applied that tempts power to 
a final, poisonous rupture of  the membrane. 
Temptation of  power usually stirs when those who wield it grow impa-
tient at its limitations—and then the impatience affects everyone down the chain. 
Credit goes to those who respond the fastest, with the credit rising level by level 
to the Office of  the President. The pressure on anyone who works in the na-
tional security apparatus of  the President can be enormous, but so are the privi-
leges. There is the government limousine, there is the guard sent to give his life, 
if  need be, to preserve the privileged person’s own. There is the deference from 
famous men who visit, from the bureaucracy below. It might exhaust—but it also 
 Hamdi S, Temptations of  Power: Islamists and Illiberal Democracy in a New Middle East, Oxford University 
Press USA, April 2014 wholly relevant. For the purposes of  this paper, the author adopts Theodore 
White’s original conception. 
32 It is instructive to note here that President Kenyatta himself  lost a nephew and his fiancé in this 
attack. Hosting a children’s’ cooking contest and among the dead was also Ruhila Adatia-Sood, a 
Nairobi local who was a popular TV and radio presenter. Among the other victims was also Juan 
Ortiz Iruri, a Peruvian national who was a hugely experienced UN tropical diseases specialist who 
was about to begin work at the Liverpool School of  Tropical Medicine (LSTM), a Diplomat and two 
Canadian nationals. Mr. Ravindra Ramttan, a winner of  a presidential gold medal in Trinidad for his 
academic prowess, and Mr. Kofi Awoonor, a Ghanaian poet, academic and former diplomat. These 
men and women are no doubt part of  the elite of  our society.
33 The state is known to have acted in unconstitutional ways many times in Kenya’s history, particularly 
in the years of  the infamous ‘Nyayo Torture Chambers’, when the Moi government was in power.
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intoxicates. Beyond the pressure shimmer many dreams—and this is what causes 
those in power, and who face the pressures, to act on the temptation of  power. 
IV. The succumbing to temptation of power and the consequent 
damage to the rule of law and human rights
Among the men who report and follow Government response to these 
major terrorist attacks, the initial reaction and response to the pressures that un-
veil the temptation of  power has become almost predictable; a national address 
by the President34 that spurns themes such as unity,35 strength36 and a coming 
justice.37 Such a speech will probably be buttressed by visits paid to the scene of  
the attack, to the victims of  the attack,38 a letter to loved ones,39 and public pro-
nouncement that the State will meet various costs accruing to those affected.40 
A commission of  inquiry was also once mooted.41 It is the reaction that follows 
these public-relation assurances that is interesting because it is in those reactions 
that we see the reach of  the temptation of  power. 
We begin with the stretching of  the membrane of  law. 
34 President Kenyatta religiously addressed the nation after the Westgate terrorist, the Mpeketoni 
attacks, the Koromey quarry attack and the Garissa University College attack. He only failed to 
address the nation after the Mandera bus attack, this because he was out of  the country, in Dubai. 
Even then, he spoke after returning to the country. 
35 In President Kenyatta’s own words after the Garissa University College attack, “I urge every Kenyan, 
every church and every local leader to speak up for our unity and ensure that our justified anger does 
not spill over and lead to the victimization of  anyone.”
36 In President Kenyatta’s words in an address to the nation after the Westgate Mall terrorist attack, 
“We confronted this evil without flinching, confronted our deep grief  and pain, and conquered it.”
37 In President Kenyatta’s words after the Westgate Mall terrorist attack, “These cowards will meet 
justice as will their accomplices and patrons wherever they are.” 
38 See http://www.the-star.co.ke:8080/news/pictures-dp-ruto-condoles-garissa-attack-victims 
#sthash. Qpr2JP4w.dpbs on 11 May 2015.
39 ‘Uhuru writes personal letters to each of  the 147 Garissa attack families’ The Star, 9 April 2015, 
www.the-star.co.ke/news/uhuru-writes-personal-letters-each-147-garissa-attack-families on 7 
December 2015.
40 See http://www.northriftnews.com/dp-ruto-says-government-will-foot-medical-and-funeral-ex-
penses-for-garissa-attack-victims/ on 11 May 2015.
41 President Kenyatta had promised, in his address to the nation after the terror attack at the Westgate 
Mall, to set up a Commission of  Inquiry. This did not materialise, see more here: http://mobile.
nation.co.ke/news/Commission-of-inquiry-that-never-was/-/1950946/2460374/-/format/
xhtml/-/1hga34/-/index.html on 13 May 2015.
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i. The stretching of the membrane of law and the damage done to 
the rule of law
Take the Koromey quarry terrorist attack, seemingly the apogee of  this raft 
of  heinous acts. The Government responded to the demands to act by lining up 
the Security Laws (Amendment) Bill 201442 that can be said to have constituted what 
would have been arguably the biggest rollback on civil rights in the country since 
the Moi years.43 It put in jeopardy, variously,44 the right to freedom of  expression 
and the right to freedom of  the media,45 the right to privacy,46 the rights of  an 
arrested person,47 and the right to fair trial,48 the entitlement to citizenship and 
registration of  persons,49 the right to freedom of  movement50 and the rights of  
refugees.51 After a brawl,52 the Bill was passed and soon after assented by the 
President.53 It is the courts that intervened to preserve the rights that were under 
42 Now the Security Laws (Amendment) Act 2014. See the original Bill, as was, here: http://www.
knchr.org/Portals/0/Bills/THE%20SECURITY%20LAWS%20AMENDMENT%20BILL%20
2014.pdf  on 15 May 2015.
43 The term ‘the Moi years’ is parlance in Kenya, used in reference to the years in Kenya in which 
Daniel Arap Moi was President, between 1978 and 2002. See Mutua M, ‘Justice Under Siege – The 
Rule of  Law and Judicial Subservience in Kenya’ 23 Human Rights Quarterly, 1(2001), 96 - 118.
44 In question was the Constitutionality of  the Sections 4, 5, 6, 12, 15, 16, 19, 20, 21, 25, 26, 29, 34, 
48, 56, 58, 64, 69, 85 and 86 of  the Act and the corresponding provisions in various Acts that they 
amended/ introduced into the law.
45 Guaranteed under Article 33 and Article 34 of  the Constitution of  Kenya (2010).
46 Guaranteed under Article 31 of  the Constitution of  Kenya (2010).
47 Guaranteed under Article 49 of  the Constitution of  Kenya (2010).
48 Guaranteed under Article 50 of  the Constitution of  Kenya (2010).
49 Guaranteed under Article 12 of  the Constitution of  Kenya (2010).
50 Guaranteed under Article 39 of  the Constitution of  Kenya (2010).
51 Under Articles 2(5) and 2(6) of  theConstitution of  Kenya (2010), International Agreements and 
Conventions ratified by the nation also become law and should be respected by the state. 
52 The conduct of  the Kenyan National Assembly that day can only be described as appalling. Tensions 
were high from the onset. The opposition, under no illusions that they had been outnumbered and 
would easily be defeated in an open vote, decided to shout down any debate in the House with 
revolutionary song. Unable to move forward, the session was adjourned to resume in the afternoon 
and when afternoon came, the ruling coalition arrived back clearly prepared for the race to the bottom. 
Scenes such as water being splashed on the presiding Speaker, a Member of  Parliament having his 
trousers torn and another Member of  Parliament having his finger bitten off  became prime time 
news conversation. More on this session of  the National Assembly can be read here: http://www.
theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/18/fights-kenya-parliament-anti-terrorism-laws on 11 May 2015 
and watched here: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zw49umKgfNU on 11 May 2015.
53 See more here: http://www.businessdailyafrica.com/President-signs-new-security-laws/-
/539546/2562660/-/4llxsp/-/index.html on 15 May 2015 for President Kenyatta’s assent. It is the 
author’s opinion that this was an attempt by government to use its power to make laws to get quick 
results in the war against terrorism. This is rule by law. It can be distinguished from rule of  law, 
according to political science professor Shuguang Li: “The difference is that, under the rule of  law, 
the law is preeminent and can serve as a check against the abuse of  power. Under rule by law, the law 
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threat. It declared some provisions of  the Act a nullity while upholding the more 
reasonable ones.54 This is the general tangent of  the temptation of  power. Under 
pressure to stem the attacks, the state becomes impatient and decides that it will 
do what it believes it takes, legal or not, to put an end to the attacks. Indeed, it is 
a signature of  the Government’s determination that even before the Court, the 
team that represented the State was a high profile one, with the Director of  Pub-
lic Prosecutions appearing as an interested party, but leaving few if  any qualms 
as to his stand on the Act.55 On this occasion, the Court dutifully intervened to 
prevent the rupture of  the membrane of  law.56
The membrane of  law almost burst once more, this time in a way that would 
have been very damaging to the rule of  law in Kenya, after the attack on the 
Garissa University College. In the now-customary57 address to the nation after 
the attack, the President, ignoring a Court order in place,58 directed that the ten 
thousand recruits whose enrolment the Court had cancelled due to allegations 
is a mere tool for a government that suppresses in a legalistic fashion.” See Tamanaha B, On the Rule 
of  Law, Cambridge University Press, 2004, 3.
54 See the Consolidated Petition No.630 of  2014 & Petition No.12 of  2015;
 Between the Coalition for Reform and Democracy (CORD) (the 1st Petitioner), the Kenya National Commission 
of  Human Rights (2nd Petitioner), Samuel Njuguna Ng’ang’a (3rd Petitioner) and the Republic of  Kenya (1st 
Respondent), the Attorney General (2nd Respondent) [2014] eKLR. See the judgement here: http://www.
shitemi.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Security-Laws-Judgement.pdf  on 11 May 2015.
55 This particular occurrence was interesting because the Director of  Public Prosecutions has rarely 
appeared in court since taking office. This author can only recall three such events, one of  which 
is this particular case. The other two are when fresh charges were opened on seven Anglo-Leasing 
corruption scandal suspects, and when Members of  Parliament from Narok region were charged 
with incitement at the Milimani Law Courts in Nairobi. See more at: http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=topL1u8oXKw on 11 May 2015. This might show the seriousness with which the 
government took the issue. The DPP appeared as an interested person and argued for the Court to 
uphold the Act in its entirety.
56 It is the author’s note that the decision by the Court on this occasion ranked high up there with some 
of  the most progressive in the world today, for instance a watershed ruling given on 16th December 
2004 in the United Kingdom where the House of  Lords, in an 8 to 1 majority, overturned a prior 
decision of  the Appeals Court and held that the preventive detention provisions of  a 2001 Act were 
in breach of  the European Convention on Human Rights: A and others v The Secretary of  State of  the Home 
Department [2004] UKHL 56. In essence the House of  Lords held that there was no state of  public 
emergency that threatened the life of  the nation enough to justify such a decision. Rather, Lord 
Hoffman in a memorable and scathing passage of  his opinion, said: ‘The real threat to the life of  
the nation, in the sense of  a people living in accordance with its traditional laws and political values, 
comes not from terrorism but from laws such as these.’ 
57 See Bennett T, Critical Trajectories: Culture, Society, Intellectuals, 141-163.
58 The order given by High Court Judge Justice Isaac Lenaola quashed the Police Recruitment exercise 
that took place in 36 recruitment centres around the country on 14 July 2014, and ordered that fresh 
recruitment take place. See: Independent Policing Oversight Authority & another v Attorney General & 660 
others [2014] eKLR.
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of  corruption be enrolled.59 The President went on to say that he would take 
‘personal responsibility’ for the order. The blowback, and this the rule of  law 
will be thankful for, was instant.60 After a few days, within which one could not 
miss some of  the apologia that was used to defend the President’s directive,61 the 
President folded and rescinded his order. In doing so, he spared the country a very 
public trial of  strength between the Presidency and the Judiciary62 that would have 
set back the rule of  law. Perhaps President Kenyatta was having his ‘President 
Jackson moment’63 or perhaps he wanted to make it clear that Government was 
getting serious with the war against terror; shorn of  the advantage of  reading his 
own reasons on record, one can only leave that task to speculation. What is clear, 
however, is that once more, the attack had created pressures that were being felt—
thus the temptation of  power—the attempt to issue an unconstitutional order. 
59 See the in full the President’s address to the nation that contained these directions here: http://www.
khcwindhoek.com/?p=884 on 11 May 2015.
60 The Commission on the Implementation of  the Constitution accused the President of  violating 
the Constitution, see: http://allafrica.com/stories/201504090038.html on 11th May 2015 while the 
Independent Policing Oversight Authority (IPOA) declared that it would go to Court to challenge 
the President’s directive, see: http://county-411.com/ipoa-to-challenge-president-uhuru-kenyattas-
directive-on-police-recruits-in-court/ on 11 May 2015.
61 In this regard, two men come to mind. The first is the Attorney General, who clearly had some 
difficulty rationalising the order, preferring to instead discuss ‘a round table discussion’ that he was 
assembling with the IPOA and other security agencies, see: http://www.businessdailyafrica.com/
Muigai-seeks-out-of-court-deal-on-police-recruits-saga/-/539546/2679774/-/n0bfstz/-/index.
html on 11 May 2015. The second is Elgeyo-Marakwet, Senator Kipchumba Murkomen, who is 
arguably one of  the finest legal minds in the country, holding two Masters of  Law degree (LLM) 
from the American University (Washington College of  Law) in the United States and University of  
Pretoria, South Africa—and has lectured the Catholic University of  Eastern Africa, the University of  
Nairobi, and Moi University, Eldoret. Invited to contribute to a Monday prime time news discussion 
on Citizen TV about the President’s decision, the Senator explained how ‘the nation is in a state of  
war’ and that this excused the President’s action. Reminded by his fellow panellist that there is an 
elaborate procedure in Article 58 of  the Constitution of  Kenya (2010) to be followed if  the President 
wanted to declare a state of  war or emergency, he could only continue to offer that ‘the judiciary is 
the one that is failing Kenyans.’
62 The Judiciary responded with a statement of  its own, issued by Director of  Public Affairs and 
Communications, Naim Bilal who, citing Article 162 of  the Constitution of  Kenya (2010), said that the 
state’s appeal against the quashing of  the initial recruitment exercise had been fast-tracked and added 
that due process must be allowed to take its natural course. In his own words, “It is important that the 
judges be allowed to make the determination on the matters before them as guaranteed by Article 162 
of  the Constitution of  Kenya (2010) without appearing to exert undue pressure on them. The judges will 
reach a determination based on the facts and the law, ” he said. See more at: http://www.capitalfm.
co.ke/news/2015/04/let-judges-do-their-jobs-judiciary-tells-uhuru/ on 12 May 2015.
63 The author uses this allusion to refer to the popular quotation that is believed to be apocryphal, 
where President Andrew Jackson reportedly responded to the United States Supreme Court decision 
in Worcester v. Georgia 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832), which he disagreed with, by saying: “John Marshall 
has made his decision; now let him enforce it!” John Marshall was the then-American Chief  Justice 
and sat in the bench that made the decision. 
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In that scenario, the membrane of  law had again been stretched very pub-
licly, but restored in time to prevent its breaking. Here one must linger, for a 
public, declared, unconstitutional action by the state is far more damaging than 
one that is done covertly. It has been said by some that the rule of  law is itself  a 
myth, and whilst that may be arguable64 what is inarguable is that the rule of  law, 
myth or not, needs to be sustained and for arbitrariness by those in power to be 
discouraged in a society. And the way that the rule of  law is weaved into society 
is through making it a custom, a culture.65 American Supreme Court judge Jus-
tice Stephen Breyer has also said as much.66 Thus when the President himself  
announces that he is prepared to break the law and ‘take personal responsibility’ 
over the matter, then the message sent to the nation is that this country is one of  
men and not of  laws.67
Finally, and because it is unusual68 yet deserves special mention, let us con-
64 See Hasnas J, ‘The Myth of  the Rule of  Law’ 199 Wisconsin Law Review (1995), wholly relevant. See 
also Bingham T, The Rule of  Law, Penguin Publishers, February 2011 re-print, wholly relevant.
65 This author remembers the question of  how the rule of  law is inculcated into a society being 
responded to by a panel of  guest speakers at the International Conference on Transformative 
Constitutions that took place at the British Institute of  Eastern Africa and the Sarova Panafric 
Hotel in Nairobi between June 9th and 11th 2014. Among the guests who responded were Professor 
Kenneth Roach, Professor & Prichard Wilson Chair in law and public policy at the University Of  
Toronto Faculty Of  Law, and Justice Kemal S. Bokhary who is a Judge on the Hong Kong Court 
of  Final Appeal. Both men responded most succinctly, making it clear that there was ‘no magic or 
formula to it’, and that only when there is a culture and custom of  following the law will the rule of  
law flourish in a country. 
66 See Breyer S, Making Democracy Work, A Judge’s View, Vintage Publishers, September 2011, 63.
67 As opposed to the original quote that “the government, country or state is one of  laws and not of  
men” attributed to Aristotle and AV Dicey. In his memorable oath of  office after taking charge as 
President following President Richard Nixon’s resignation, American President Gerald Ford also 
said “Our Constitution works; our great Republic is a government of  laws and not of  men. Here 
the people rule.” See more at: http://www.history.com/topics/us-presidents/gerald-r-ford/videos/
inaugural-address-gerold-ford on 12 May 2015.
68 It is unusual because it is not clear that the pressures that the author comes up with in the paper, that 
is public mood spurred on by the media, are what led to it. While it is true that there were always 
pressures that led to the action, it may be that these pressures were different from the ones that 
this paper attempts to compile as leading to the temptation of  power and it will be fortuitous to 
attempt to understand this pressures, not least because of  the lack of  transparency of  this operation. 
It is, however, speculated in a report by Crisis Group, The Kenyan Military Intervention in Somalia 
Crisis Group Africa Report N°184, 15 February 2012 (page 3, footnote 27 of  the Report) that “the 
political leadership did not go to this war after months of  planning, analysis, budget allocation.… 
it went to this war purely to soothe the Western tourist circuit and gain political mileage and also 
probably to distract Kenyans’ attention from the fight over next year’s general elections date, ” Crisis 
Group email correspondence, former Kenya army officer, November 2011. See here the report 
link: www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/horn-of-africa/kenya/184 - The Kenyan Military 
Intervention in Somalia on 8 December 2015.
  See the report here: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/horn-of-africa/
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sider ‘Operation Linda Nchi’, the military operation that sent over three thousand 
Kenyan soldiers into Southern Somalia to ‘pursue Al Shabaab and other armed 
terrorist elements, that had sought to destabilise our country, our economy and 
the region.’69 It is critical to note that this paper is not going into the question of  
whether this operation was and remains right or wrong, or whether it is this op-
eration that has led to the rampant attacks;70 for that would mean an entirely new 
paper, or perhaps an excursus, in itself, and because besides a book published one 
year ago,71 official information on the operation is difficult to come by.72 What 
this paper is going to show is how the decision to go into the war was made.
That the nation knew little of  the operation until two days after the in-
tervention73 says much about the transparency that Government allowed. Yet 
kenya/184%20%20The%20Kenyan%20Military%20Intervention%20in%20Somalia.pdfon 15 May 
2015.
69 These reasons are taken directly from then-President Mwai Kibaki’s speech to the gathering at 
the London Conference on Somalia on 23rd February 2012 at Lancaster House, London, Para. 5. 
Read the whole speech here: http://www.kenyaembassyaddis.org/wp-content/uploads/speeches/
presidential/LONDON_CONFERENCE_ON_SOMALIA_23RD_FEBRUARY_2012.pdf  on 15 
May 2015.
70 It cannot, however, be lost on any keen observer that between 2002 and 2011 it is not easy to find 
any recorded terrorist attack by the Al Shabaab in the country. According to Kenya’s Anti-Terrorism 
Police Unit, the country has suffered 133 terror-related attacks – one every eight days – since the 
offensive began. It is difficult to see this as a coincidence that was bound to happen. Even more 
interestingly, Robert Pape, a University of  Chicago political science professor and former Air Force 
lecturer, recently presented findings to the US Congress that argue that the majority of  terrorism 
attacks around the world since 1980 have had a common cause: military occupation. Pape and his 
team of  researchers draw on data produced by a six-year study of  terrorist attacks around the world 
that was partially funded by the Defence Department’s Defence Threat Reduction Agency. They 
compiled the terrorism statistics in a publicly available database comprising some 10, 000 records on 
some 2, 200 terrorist attacks, dating back to the first suicide terrorism attack of  modern times — the 
1983 truck bombing of  the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut, Lebanon, which killed 241 U.S. Marines.
71 See the book, Migue T, Operation Linda Nchi: Kenya’s Military Experience in Somalia, Kenya Literature 
Bureau and Worldreader, 14 October 2015. Although seen as a significant improvement in 
transparency and openness in state affairs, the book has also been criticised by book reviewer 
John Ngirachu as being ‘under the eye of  the military authors’; of  overkill in being preoccupied 
with describing the necessity and accomplishment that taking Kismayu was; and of  giving little 
information about what exactly the military is doing in Somalia and how the Al-Shabaab can still 
have the capacity to strike in our country. 
72 There is no official government report online and what one is left to examine is the correspondence 
on the Social Media site Twitter and news reports. These news reports are in themselves questionable, 
for most of  them apply a phenomenon called ‘war reporting’ rather than ‘peace reporting.’ ‘War 
reporting’ is a way in which the press reports a conflict to feed society’s needs, in this case by 
showing Kenyan soldiers winning the war on terror. It is a market-driven approach to news that 
conceptualizes as a market. See Ogenga F, ‘Is Peace Journalism Possible in the War against Terror in 
Somalia’ 11 Conflict and Communication Online, 2 (2012), 3.
73 Read The Kenyan Military Intervention in Somalia Crisis Group Africa Report N°184, 15 February 
2012, 3. Find it here:www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/horn-of-africa/kenya/184 - The 
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perhaps that opacity was required so as not to give the enemy information to 
threaten the security of  our troops. What is outstanding is that the decision to 
send these troops to Somalia was never presented74 to Parliament, yet Article 
132 (4) (e) of  the Constitution of  Kenya (2010) requires that Parliament approve 
any war effort.75 Neither the people nor the representatives of  the people gave 
their imprimatur for this intervention to take place. It may be argued that this is 
not ‘a war’ in the literal sense of  the word, but even this would be reading the 
Constitution of  Kenya pedantically and contrary to Article 259, which states that 
the Constitution is a living document that must be interpreted widely.76 Without 
examining the merits of  this decision, this paper puts forward that it has set a bad 
precedence for the rule of  law in Kenya, keeping in mind that many times before 
and after this, the military has been deployed within the country,77 again without 
approval from Parliament, and is documented to have committed many human 
rights abuses against civilians.78
ii. The rupturing of the membrane of law and the damage done to hu-
man rights and society
Sometimes the membrane of  law ruptures. While this rupture is hard to see 
for one who is not directly affected, it is eventually inescapable, partly thanks to 
the media. 
To accurately show how temptation of  power leads to the rupturing of  
the membrane of  law and the results that follow, one has to go to only one 
Kenyan Military Intervention in Somalia.pdf  on 15 May 2015.
74 Read The Kenyan Military Intervention in Somalia Crisis Group Africa Report N°184, 15 February 2012, 3. 
The intervention was discussed and approved by the cabinet on 18 October. See Leftie P, ‘Kenya, 
Somalia seal pact to hit Shabaab’, Daily Nation, 19 October 2011.
75 Article 132 (4) (e) of  the Constitution of  Kenya (2010), reads that ‘The President may, with the approval 
of  Parliament, declare war.’
76 Article 259 (1) reads that ‘this Constitution shall be interpreted in a manner that— (a) promotes its 
purposes, values and principles; (b) advances the rule of  law, and the human rights and fundamental 
freedoms in the Bill of  Rights; (c) permits the development of  the law; and (d) contributes to good 
governance.’
77 Consider that the Kenya Defence Forces were deployed in Lamu after the Mpeketoni attacks and in 
Kapedo to quell cattle rustling, see : ‘West Pokot leaders demand withdrawal of  KDF from Kapedo, 
threaten to sue at ICC’ here: http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/thecounties/Article/2000140878/
west-pokot-leaders-demand-withdrawal-of-kdf-from-kapedo-threaten-to-sue-at-icc on 16 May 
2015.
78 A Kenyan army operation against the Sabaot Land Defence Force is, for instance, said to have left 
over 600 people dead and terrorised thousands more in the Mount Elgon area close to the Ugandan 
border. This is typical of  KDF operations. Read The Mountain of  Terror, A Report on the Investigations of  
Torture by the Military at Mt. Elgon, May 2008 by the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights.
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place in Kenya: the Coast region. For, in the last few years, the Coast has been 
a cauldron.79 Long before it simmered, the first strands of  terrorism were seen 
at the Coast on November 28th 2002 when the Israeli-owned ‘Paradise Hotel’ 
in Kikambala, fifteen miles north of  Mombasa, was attacked by three suicide 
bombers who drove an explosive-packed car into the gates, killing nine Kenyans 
and three Israeli tourists.80 If  these were the proverbial warning shots being fired, 
there was a huge lull81 before those who were giving the warning scaled up their 
efforts. Eventually, however, they did.82 And the reaction by Government was 
overwhelming.
If  there were any post for key antagonist in the war against terror at the 
Coast in Kenya, then this post has been fully claimed by the Anti-Terrorism Po-
lice Unit83 (hereinafter referred to as the ATPU) which seems to have a record-
breaking catalogue of  actions rupturing the membrane of  law.
The group Human Rights Watch84 found evidence of  at least ten cases of  
extra-judicial killings of  terrorism suspects,85 some of  whom were last seen in 
ATPU custody or had been threatened by the unit’s officers after courts had 
released them. Several suspects were facing terrorism-related charges, were re-
quired to report to the unit either weekly or monthly and had told family and 
friends they had received death threats from ATPU officers they recognized. In 
other cases, the threats were issued in the presence of  associates that Human 
Rights Watch says it interviewed. In at least three of  the killings, the unit claimed 
79 While it is true that the ‘major’ terrorist attacks have happened outside this County, there have 
been numerous ‘minor’ attacks of  this sort here. In addition, this County seems to be one of  the 
centres of  the so-called ‘radicalisation’ of  the youth who eventually join terrorist groups, see Botha 
A, Institute for Security Studies, Radicalisation in Kenya: Recruitment to Al Shabaab and the Mombasa 
Republican Council, September 2014.
80 See more here: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/nov/28/israel.kenya on 12 May 2015.
81 From this attack in 2002, the tension at the Coast and attacks that related to terrorism seemed to 
resume only since 2011.
82 The numerous attacks that this author relies on to make the assertion that ‘they did’ are detailed on 
pages 1, 2 and 3 of  this paper. There were at least 70 grenade and gun attacks in Nairobi, Mombasa, 
and Garissa between 2011 and 2014, with at least 30 attacks in 2012 alone.
83 The ATPU was created within the Criminal Investigations Department (CID) in 2003 in response to 
the attacks on the US Embassy in Nairobi in 1998 and on Paradise Hotel in Kikambala, Mombasa, 
in 2002.
84 Human Rights Watch is a group that defends the human rights of  people worldwide. Find out more 
about it here: http://www.hrw.org/about on 12 May 2015.
85 Some include Shabaan Namusenda Makotse in April 2013, Sheikh Hassan Suleiman Mwayuyu 
in December 2013, Hassan Omondi Owiti and Shekha Wanjiru, in May 2013, Khalif  Mwangi 
in May 2013 and Ibrahim Ramadhan Mwasi in June 2013 ; See more here: http://www.hrw.org/
news/2014/08/18/kenya-killings-disappearances-anti-terror-police on 12 May 2015.
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that the suspects were killed in a fire fight. Human Rights Watch said that it did 
not find evidence of  a shootout, as witness descriptions pointed to a short-lived, 
targeted killing by security officers, and the scene suggested the shooting was 
unidirectional without any damage to the surrounding buildings as ATPU had 
suggested. In other cases, the ATPU did not accept responsibility for the killings, 
but its officers were either seen with the suspects before they were killed or took 
the bodies to the mortuary without notifying the families.
Under Kenyan and International Law, police may use lethal force only when 
necessary for self-defence or to save a life. The National Police Service Act of  201186 
also requires police officers who use lethal fire to report to their immediate su-
perior explaining the circumstances that necessitated the use of  force. Similarly, 
the Act requires officials to report any use of  force that leads to death or serious 
injury87 to the Independent Police Oversight Authority88 for investigation. Hu-
man Rights Watch reported that Police authorities have not complied with these 
requirements in these cases of  extrajudicial killings.
Further, the United Nations Basic Principles on the Use of  Force and Firearms by 
Law Enforcement Officials89 requires that law enforcement officials use nonviolent 
means whenever possible and use lethal force only when it is strictly unavoidable 
to protect life. 
The principles also require governments to ensure that arbitrary or abusive 
use of  force and firearms by law-enforcement officials is punished as a criminal 
offense under their law. It is almost as if  human rights are an unknown quan-
tity when it comes to several actions of  the ATPU. A further probe by Human 
Rights Watch has documented the enforced disappearances of  at least ten young 
men by ATPU officers from Nairobi between 2011 and 2013.90 The men faced 
terrorism-related charges in various Kenyan courts, were under investigation by 
86 Section 4, National Police Service Act (Act 11 of  2011).
87 Section 5, National Police Service Act (Act 11 of  2011).
88 The IPOA is an independent authority established under the Independent Policing Oversight Authority Act 
(No. 35 of  2011) to provide for civilian oversight over the work of  the police in Kenya. 
89 Find the Basic Principles on the Use of  Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials that was 
adopted by the Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of  Crime and the Treatment of  
Offenders, Havana, Cuba between 27th August and 7th September 1990 here: http://www.ohchr.
org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/UseOfForceAndFirearms.aspx on 12 May 2015.
90 Some of  the victims according to the Report by Human Rights Watch included Sylvester (Musa) 
Opiyo Osodo and Jacob (Yaqub) Musyoka in May 2012, Abdulaziz Muchiri and Ali Kipkoech Musa 
in May 2013, and Yassin Olunga and Ali Musadiki, last seen in Nairobi in April 2013; See more on 
this here: http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/08/18/kenya-killings-disappearances-anti-terror-police 
on 15 May 2015.
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the ATPU, or had been acquitted. All of  them had told family members, friends, 
and associates whom Human Rights Watch interviewed that they received direct 
death threats from ATPU officers.91 On December 8th 2014, Aljazeera and JSC 
(Jazeera Satellite Channel) also aired a documentary titled ‘Inside Kenya’s Death 
Squads’ that reported, after investigation and interviews, about a Kenyan govern-
ment assassination programme targeting suspected Muslim radicals.92 The Gov-
ernment denied all allegations and moved to take legal action against the makers 
of  the documentary.93
As if  giving the orders and having them carried out covertly is not enough, 
Mombasa County Commissioner, Nelson Marwa, is on record declaring a shoot-
to-kill order on all terrorism suspects. Marwa claimed that it is counter-produc-
tive to take terror suspects to court because it is very difficult to prosecute them 
or find witnesses in their prosecution.94
All these actions are orchestrated despite the Constitution being clear that 
‘The National Police Service shall comply with constitutional standards of  hu-
man rights and fundamental freedoms.’95
Thus the other key effect of  this succumbing to the temptation of  power 
and the consequent bursting of  the membrane of  law becomes clear: the disre-
gard for human rights. And here one must dwell. For if  there is any situation that 
should prick the conscience more than any other, it should be the violation of  
human rights by the very state that is supposed to protect them. Yet what pricks 
the conscience even more in this nation must be the collective sigh that one could 
sense has been the national mood when charges of  violation of  human rights 
in the war against terror were brought against the Government on several occa-
91 The International Convention for the Protection of  All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, which Kenya has 
not signed, defines an enforced disappearance as “the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form 
of  deprivation of  liberty by agents of  the state or by persons or groups of  persons acting with 
the authorization, support or acquiescence of  the state, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the 
deprivation of  the liberty or by concealment of  the fate or whereabouts of  the disappeared person, 
which place such a person outside the protection of  the law.”
92 Watch the full film here: http://interactive.aljazeera.com/aje/KenyaDeathSquads/ on 14 May 2015.
93 See documents filed in Court here: http://big.assets.huffingtonpost.com/KenyaAlJazeeraDec2014.
pdf  on 13 May 2015. The suit does not seem to have moved forward since then. 
94 Speaking directly to then-Mombasa County Police Commander Robert Kitur, Marwa said the shoot-
to-kill order had been prompted by the fact that criminals gangs had infiltrated the county and it was 
fair to kill the criminals as it would bring them to the justice they deserve on behalf  of  the victims. 
See more here: http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/thecounties/Article/2000107870/police-issue-
shoot-to-kill-order-on-terrorism-suspects on 12 May 2015.
95 Article 244 (c) Constitution of  Kenya (2010).
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sions, and in particular during ‘Operation Usalama Watch.’96 This national mood, 
as always, was on display by the press. The human rights violations were treated 
indifferently, almost with a blasé response. Only those directly affected were left 
to plead and protest. The few who did so and yet had not been directly affected 
were looked at as the usual maudlin humanitarians who did not need the ‘straight’ 
world and whose pleasure it was to cause trouble; to be against. Be patriotic and 
get behind government in the war against terror, they were told.97
And what do these human rights violations do to society? 
It was American politician, Barry Goldwater, who was first recorded as say-
ing that ‘extremism in the defence of  liberty is no vice while moderation in the 
pursuit of  justice is no virtue.’98 On August 28th 2012, a large group of  youth in 
Mombasa seemingly agreed with the cri de coeur and riots gripped Mombasa after 
Aboud Rogo Mohammed, a controversial Muslim cleric who was suspected of  
being a key recruiter for Kenyan Muslims fighting in Somalia, was shot dead;99 
on October 4th 2013, a similar situation took place after unidentified gunmen, be-
lieved to be the ATPU, shot cleric Ibrahim ‘Rogo’ Omar and three other people 
dead in Mombasa as they drove home;100 and on Saturday November 8th 2014, it 
again occurred after unidentified gunmen (police denied involvement but sourc-
es within the force said that officers of  the ATPU were involved) shot and killed 
Hassan Guti as he was driving in the city with his wife and niece.101
96 This operation, sensationally christened ‘Kasarani Concentration Camps’ by the Muslim Human 
Rights Organization (MUHURI) was another government attempt to rein in on the rampant attacks. 
It took place in July 2014 and saw the roundup of  hundreds of  people of  the Somali Community at 
the Kasarani Stadium. See more here: http://allafrica.com/stories/201407031424.html on 12 May 
2015.
97 These words came from a wide-ranging interview that the author had with one of  the Directors 
of  MUHURI (notes with the author). The same theme was being driven by the politicians who 
appeared on prime time news to discuss the matter. Politicians from the opposition coalition who 
raised the matter of  human rights violations seemed to be raising it merely to show what they 
considered the inept nature of  government. 
98 See the text of  Barry Goldwater’s 1964 speech at the 28th Republican National Convention, 
accepting the nomination for president here: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/politics/
daily/may98/goldwaterspeech.htm on 7 December 2015. This theme was first advanced by Mr. 
Goldwater at the Republican Convention of  1964 and adopted as their own, and at the Democratic 
Convention of  1968, by the rioters and the police who responded to them.
99 See more here: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-19394364 on 12 May 2015.The state 
should, nevertheless, receive praise for constituting an inquest into this killing, see more here: 
http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/thecounties/Article/2000110518/sheikh-aboud-rogo-killers-
were-arabs-inquest-hears on 13 May 2015.
100 See more here: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-24398548 on 12 May 2015.
101 See more here: www.nation.co.ke/counties/mombasa/Hassan-Guti-alias-Nasralla-shot-
dead/-/1954178/2515998/-/mb670xz/-/index.html on 7 December 2015.
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These were no run-of-the-mill riots as the rioters engaged police in run-
ning battles and the city was shut down for days. And as the men who reported 
the revolution in China years ago found out, by the time the guerrilla forces 
surfaced in any province, political infection had metastasized there too deeply 
to be stopped. The situation at the Coast was almost similar, and many times 
since then, and particularly after Friday prayers, police have been forced to de-
ploy heavily to deter rioting. Mombasa remains restless. This is what a society in 
breakdown experiences. This is what happens when the human rights of  a group 
of  people, no matter how minor, are ignored. These people react102 and it is even 
more instructive that a poll released by South Africa’s Institute of  Security Stud-
ies (ISS) suggests that Kenya’s response to terrorism may have aggravated the 
crisis and that many Muslim youths have joined extremist groups in reaction to 
the Government’s collective punishment of  Muslims and assassination of  reli-
gious leaders.103
So what does this paper recommend that the state does?
V. By Way of conclusion
It is not lost on this author that one may make accusations, plausible or not, 
that this paper is living in a world of  its own; that these are the usual ideas from 
an academic who is sipping café lattes under palm trees thinking up new ideas;104 
that this paper is but part of  those that write and betray the derivative intellectual 
scorn that exists in men who profess a higher morality rather than, and for, those 
who must compromise with reality or settle for less than perfect in order to make 
things work now. 
102 It is interesting to note that the situation in the Coast and in particular in Mombasa, is far from calm. 
The closure of  the mosques that followed in another swoop only heightened matters. See more here: 
http://www.coastweek.com/3747-Tension-high-in-Mombasa-as-police-intensify-mosque-raids.htm 
on 12 May 2015. 
103 See Institute for Security Studies Africa, ‘Is Kenya’s response to terrorism making it worse?’15 October 
2014. See it here: http://www.issafrica.org/about-us/press-releases/is-kenyas-response-to-
terrorism-making-it-worse on 16 May 2015.
104 The quote is taken from a Stanford Law Review panel discussion titled ‘Do inmates run the asylum?’, 
para. 19 in which James Brosnahan, then a partner in Morrison & Foerster and a practicing trial lawyer, 
agreed that law reviews have become more theoretical, but he urged the editors not to listen to those 
who say theory is not interesting to lawyers and judges in the field. In his own words, “The concept that 
over in academia, and sipping café lattes, is a world of  thought, and out beyond are grinding practitioners 
with old briefcases who care nothing for ideas - that’s a destructive idea. It’s doing enormous damage to 
the practice of  law and the way the public views lawyers in the United States.” 
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The truth is that this author appreciates the existential threat that these ter-
rorist attacks have come to pose to our nation. What is unacceptable is the charge 
that we must now be willing to sacrifice the rule of  law and individual rights, for 
human rights are by nature supposed to be person by person105 and indeed, that 
this can be done without due process. It is the re-enactment of  the American 
Government’s conduct in Korematsu.106 And what leads to the state taking such 
an approach are the pressures that come with each attack, and that lead to the 
temptation of  power.
This paper proposes first, that we address these pressures that lead to the 
temptation of  power and then to the stretching or breaking of  the membrane of  
law. To address these pressures is to address the issue of  public mood and the 
press. And to address the issue of  the press is to address public mood. Yet on 
the issue of  the press, the best one can do is to urge and hope107 that even with 
a profit motivation, it can understand its place in conditioning public mood and 
use its power responsibly. This paper proposes that one way through which the 
press can de-escalate this is by focusing its reporting on highlighting institutional 
gaps and failures (and pressuring for action on these) as much as it does placing 
the blame on individuals, and too widely at that.108 In this way one of  the key 
pressures that lead to the temptation of  power will be eased, and the pressure on 
those in power will be to act to fix the institutions, not to earn credit and preserve 
themselves through unconstitutional actions.
This paper posits that the press should also use its power to back human 
rights and the rule of  law more robustly. It must speak out when these are violat-
105 See the opening of  the Universal Declaration of  Human Rights here: http://www.un.org/
Overview/rights.html on 12 May 2015.
106 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 [1944] was a landmark United States Supreme Court case 
concerning the Constitutionality of  Executive Order 9066, which ordered Japanese Americans into 
internment camps during World War II regardless of  citizenship. The court then went on to uphold 
the order but is today widely repudiated, with the United States Justice Department even urging, and 
the Courts following, its termination as precedence.
107 Because creating Legislation on such an issue will curtail the Freedom of  the Media, guaranteed 
under Article 34 of  the Constitution of  Kenya (2010).
108 After each terrorist attack, there was a narrative, driven in no small part by the press, that those 
who were in charge of  the security of  this nation had no idea what they were doing. Then-Cabinet 
Secretary Joseph Ole Lenku and Inspector General of  Police David Kimaiyo were especially victims. 
The press, sadly for this author, did not charge with specifics; nor did they take as much time to 
highlight the gaps in these institutions that deal with security. What the author hopes is that the 
Press can see and highlight, with equal gusto, that the attacks are not just the story of  the Inspector 
General of  Police or the Cabinet Secretary being incompetent as many would claim, but part of  a 
nationwide phenomenon, a disease of  the system itself. 
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ed as loudly as it does when the state trains its sights on curtailing media rights.109 
It is this author’s hope that journalists in Kenya can take a cue from one Edward 
R. Murrow in this regard. In a career spanning twenty-five years at the Columbia 
Broadcasting System, he bequeathed to those who worked for and with him 
something more important than opportunity and fame: he bequeathed a sense 
of  conscience and importance with which neither management nor government 
could interfere. His concept of  public advocacy emboldened him to speak for 
the African-Americans against government, for the poor against landlords and 
for the hungry against the establishment.110
The presence of  the pressures are, nonetheless, not an excuse for taking un-
constitutional actions and this paper then proposes that the government insists 
on all its officials preserving the membrane of  law in all their actions and makes 
sure that those who take actions that contradict this insistence face consequences 
and it is this author’s opinion that the consequences for officials who take un-
constitutional and/ or extra-constitutional actions should range from a severe 
reprimand (if  the membrane of  law is only strained) to being charged in Court 
(should the membrane of  law be ruptured by an action). Government should, 
109 During the debate that ensued about the Security Laws Amendment Act (Act No 19 of  2014), the 
Media was at pains to highlight and continuously debate the clauses that affected them. The Penal 
Code had been amended to include Section 66 which provided that any person who publishes gory or 
offensive material likely to disturb public peace or order will be guilty of  a felony and may be fined 
up to 1 million shillings or be imprisoned for 3 years while a media enterprise guilty of  the same 
action would be liable to a fine of  up to 5 million shillings. 
 The Prevention of  Terrorism Act was also amended to include Section 30A in relation to publication of  
offending materials. It stated that “A person who publishes or utters a statement that is likely to be 
understood as directly or indirectly encouraging or inducing another person to commit or prepare 
to commit an act of  terrorism commits an offence and is liable on conviction to imprisonment for a 
term not exceeding 14 years.” The Section also established a threshold under which such incitement 
can be inferred; either when the circumstances and manner of  the publications are such that it can 
reasonably be inferred that it was so intended or the intention is apparent from the contents of  the 
statement.
 Another significant Amendment under the Prevention of  Terrorism Act was Section 30F which stipulated 
that any person who publishes or broadcasts any information that would be seen to undermine 
security operations or investigations related to terrorism without the authorisation of  the National 
Police Service is guilty of  a felony and could be jailed for up to 3 years or fined 5 million shillings. 
Also, a person who publishes photographs of  victims of  a terrorist attack without the authorisation 
of  the National Police Service would also be liable with similar penalty. Perhaps even more intriguing 
was the fervour with which the major Media Houses in Kenya fought the Communications Authority 
of  Kenya between January and February 2015 during the Digital Migration crisis when they began 
their bulletins with 2 to 3 news items every day highlighting what they believed was unfair conduct 
by the CAK towards them.
110 White T, The Making of  the President 1972, 274. See also: http://dca.lib.tufts.edu/features/murrow/
exhibit/ on 15 May 2015. There is also a film on his exploits, particularly his fight with Senator Joe 
McCarthy by the name ‘Good Night and Good Luck.’
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moreover, turn its focus towards restoring the authority of  the institutions that 
have a bearing on the security of  Kenyans. In this regard, one might name the 
National Police Service,111 the National Intelligence Service,112 the Criminal In-
vestigations Department,113 the Office of  the Director of  Public Prosecutions,114 
the Department of  Interior,115 the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission116 
and the Witness Protection Agency117 among others. For it is the erosion of  the 
authority of  some of  these institutions (a mysterious process118 of  which the 
most that can be said is that once it starts, it tends not to stop) that has enabled 
these attacks. This task will no doubt be challenging. It will require that the Presi-
dent leads as Government takes the fight to the ‘mobs’ that are holding these 
institutions hostage: for instance the millionaires who benefit from each corrupt 
deal and those who could care less about merit.
Government should try to follow this blueprint because at the end of  the 
day, terrorism is but a criminal action that is heightened; indeed, a ‘normal’ crimi-
nal wants to merely enrich himself  while a terrorist is a criminal who sees him-
self  a revolutionary. Not just a revolutionary, but a revolutionary of  the confes-
sional type, who is always the most difficult for the authorities to handle. He 
111 Established under Article 245 of  the Constitution of  Kenya (2010), and Cap 84, the National Police Service 
Act (Act 11 of  2011).
112 Established under Article 242 of  the Constitution of  Kenya 2010 and the National Intelligence Service Act 
(Act No. 28 of  2012).
113 Which is under the National Police Service.
114 Established under Article 157 of  the Constitution of  Kenya (2010), and The Office of  the Director of  Public 
Prosecutions Act (Act No. 2 of  2013).
115 Cabinet docket in Kenya that is in charge of  Security. The Department was created under Article 152 
of  the Constitution of  Kenya (2010). It is the opinion of  this author that the responsibilities under the 
docket are overwhelming and, as such, it might be prudent to create a Department to deal exclusively 
with terrorism issues. This will still leave the total number of  dockets below the Constitutional cap 
of  22. 
116 Rampant corruption has been seen to pose a huge setback in the war against terrorism, especially 
within the Department of  Immigration, and in border control. The Ethics & Anti-Corruption 
Commission, established under Article 230 of  the Constitution of  Kenya (2010), and the Ethics & Anti-
Corruption Commission Act (Act No. 2 of  2011) seems constantly embroiled in turf  wars and unable 
to fulfil its mandate beyond mere talk, see more here: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/
mar/19/corruption-has-opened-door-to-al-shabaab-in-kenya on 12 May 2015.
117 The Witness Protection Agency of  Kenya was set up under the Witness Protection Act 2006 and the 
Witness Protection (Amendment) Act 2010. Both of  these Acts are available on eKLR. It is the opinion 
of  the author that this agency is weak and underfunded by the exchequer, and this hampers it from 
playing the key role that it can play in helping the state win the war on terror. Those with information 
on the recruitment and terrorist activities are not assured of  safety and have no reason to give this 
information to the authorities. Its strengthening is crucial and should be prioritised. 
118 A process that then-Harvard Professor Daniel Patrick Moynihan valiantly attempted to study in 
1969.
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will therefore do whatever it takes, including killing as many people as possible, 
for the cause. The holes in the whole system that enable criminality are what 
Government should attempt to plug, because it is these holes that enable nor-
mal criminality that also enable the heightened criminality that is terrorism. And 
most importantly, these holes can be plugged in a legal way; this author proposes, 
for instance, fighting border-point corruption; ensuring that police officers are 
well-recruited, well-motivated, well-equipped and posted; and increasing efforts 
towards counter terrorism—for example, by passing legislation targeting educa-
tion and jobs in places that are at the heart of  the effort to recruit the youth into 
these terror groups. 
Terrorism is indeed a skein of  many threads and if  one must pull a single 
root thread from the tangle, it is well to start with positive action geared towards 
ending the hopelessness and joblessness in these areas. Only through the State 
vying to win the hearts and minds of  the would-be recruits in this way will it be 
dealing with terrorism in the long term. And winning the hearts and minds is just 
as important because sometimes, amid all the mire, we forget that terrorism is a 
human problem. Indeed, as Cassius is recorded to have said to Brutus, ‘the fault, 
dear Brutus, is not in our stars, but in ourselves.’119
119 Shakespeare, Julius Caesar, Act 1, Scene 2, 6.
